How many family homes can a person constitute or be a beneficiary of?

A person may constitute, or be the beneficiary of, only one family home for purposes of availing the benefits of a family home. (Art. 161, FC)

What happens if the person constituting the family home dies?

If there are beneficiaries who survive and are living in the family home, it will continue for 10 years, unless at the expiration of 10 years, there is still a minor beneficiary, in which case the family home continues until that beneficiary becomes of age. (Patricio vs. Dario, G.R. No. 170829, November 20, 2006)

The family home shall continue for a period of ten (10) years or for as long as there is a minor beneficiary. The heirs cannot partition the same unless the court finds compelling reasons therefor. This rule shall apply regardless of whoever owns the property or constituted the family home. (Art. 159, FC)

What is the duration of the exemption against execution enjoyed by the family home?

The exemption is effective from the time of the constitution of the family home as such, and lasts so long as any of its beneficiaries actually resides therein. (Art. 153, FC)

What are the requisites to be a beneficiary of the family home?

To be a beneficiary of the family home, three requisites must concur: 

(1) they must be among the relationships enumerated in Art. 154 of the Family Code; 

(2) they live in the family home; and 

(3) they are dependent for legal support upon the head of the family. (Patricio vs. Dario, G.R. No. 170829, November 20, 2006)

Who are the beneficiaries of the family home?

The beneficiaries of a family home are:

(1) The husband and wife, or an unmarried person who is the head of a family; and

(2) Their parents, ascendants, descendants, brothers and sisters, whether the relationship be legitimate or illegitimate, who are living in the family home and who depend upon the head of the family for legal support. (Art. 154,FC)

Can the family home be sold or otherwise alienated? Under what conditions?

The family home may be sold, alienated, donated, assigned or encumbered by the owner or owners thereof with the written consent of the person constituting the same, the latter's spouse, and a majority of the beneficiaries of legal age. In case of conflict, the court shall decide. (Art. 158, FC)

When should the protection against execution, forced sale or attachment enjoyed by the family home be invoked?

● At no other time can the status of a residential house as a family home can be set up and proved and its exemption from execution be claimed but before the sale thereof at public auction. (Sps. De Mesa v. Sps. Acero, G.R. No. 185064, 16 January 2012)

● While it is true that the family home is constituted on a house and lot from the time it is occupied as a family residence and is exempt from execution or forced sale under Article 153 of the Family Code, such claim for exemption should be set up and proved to the Sheriff before the sale of the property at public auction. Failure to do so would estop the party from later claiming the exemption. (Honrado v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 166333, November 25, 2005)

● The settled rule is that the right to exemption or forced sale under Article 153 of the Family Code is a personal privilege granted to the judgment debtor and as such, it must be claimed not by the sheriff, but by the debtor himself before the sale of the property at public auction. (Honrado v. Court of Appeals, ibid.)

What is the remedy of the judgment creditor if the value of the family home exceeds the maximum amount fixed by law?

When a creditor whose claims is not among those mentioned in Article 155 obtains a judgment in his favor, and he has reasonable grounds to believe that the family home is actually worth more than the maximum amount fixed in Article 157, he may apply to the court which rendered the judgment for an order directing the sale of the property under execution. The court shall so order if it finds that the actual value of the family home exceeds the maximum amount allowed by law as of the time of its constitution. If the increased actual value exceeds the maximum allowed in Article 157 and results from subsequent voluntary improvements introduced by the person or persons constituting the family home, by the owner or owners of the property, or by any of the beneficiaries, the same rule and procedure shall apply.

At the execution sale, no bid below the value allowed for a family home shall be considered. The proceeds shall be applied first to the amount mentioned in Article 157, and then to the liabilities under the judgment and the costs. The excess, if any, shall be delivered to the judgment debtor. (Art. 160, FC)

Up to what extent is the family home exempt from execution, forced sale or attachment?

Article 157 of the Family Code allows the exemption of the family home from execution, forced sale or attachment if its actual value does not exceed, at the time of its constitution, the amount of P300,000.00 in urban areas and P200,000.00 in rural areas, or such amounts as may be fixed by law. Should the value of the currency changes after the adoption of the Family Code, the value most favorable for the constitution of a family home shall be the basis of evaluation.

Urban areas are deemed to include chartered cities and municipalities whose annual income at least equals that legally required for chartered cities. All others are deemed to be rural areas. 

When is a family home not exempt from execution, forced sale or attachment?

Under Art. 155 of the FC, while the family home shall be exempt from execution, forced sale or attachment, it may not be so except for:

(1) nonpayment of taxes;

(2) debts incurred prior to the constitution of the family home;

(3) debts secured by mortgages on the premises before or after such constitution; and

(4) debts due to laborers, mechanics, architects, builders, materialmen and others who have rendered service or furnished material for the construction of the building.

What is the law regarding the exemption of a family home from execution, forced sale or attachment?

Under Art. 153 of the Family Code, from the time of the constitution and so long as any of the beneficiaries of the family home actually resides therein, the family home is exempt from execution, forced sale or attachment except as provided for in Art. 155 of the Family Code and to the extent of the value allowed by law. 

What are the rules on constitution of family homes for purposes of exemption from execution?

First, family residences constructed before the effectivity of the Family Code or before August 3, 1988 must be constituted as a family home either judicially or extrajudicially in accordance with the provisions of the Civil Code in order to be exempt from execution;

Second, family residences constructed after the effectivity of the Family Code on August 3, 1988 are automatically deemed to be family homes and thus exempt from execution from the time it was constituted and lasts as long as any of its beneficiaries actually resides therein;

Third, family residences which were not judicially or extrajudicially constituted as a family home prior to the effectivity of the Family Code, but were existing thereafter, are considered as family homes by operation of law and are prospectively entitled to the benefits accorded to a family home under the Family Code. (Sps. De Mesa v. Sps. Acero, G.R. No. 185064, 16 January 2012)

How is family home constituted?

Before the effectivity of the Family Code on August 3, 1988, a family home can constituted either judicially or extra-judicially as provided under Articles 225, 229-231 and 233 of the Civil Code. Judicial constitution of the family home requires the filing of a verified petition before the courts and the registration of the court’s order with the Registry of Deeds of the area where the property is located. Meanwhile, extrajudicial constitution is governed by Articles 240 to 242 of the Civil Code and involves the execution of a public instrument which must also be registered with the Registry of Property. (Sps. De Mesa v. Sps. Acero, G.R. No. 185064, 16 January 2012)

After the effectivity of the Family Code: Under the Family Code, a family home is deemed constituted on a house and lot from the time it is occupied as a family residence. There is no need to constitute the same judicially or extrajudicially as required in the Civil Code. (Modequillo vs. Breva, GR. No. 86355, May 31, 1990) All family homes constructed after the effectivity of the Family Code are constituted as such by operation of law. All existing family residences as of August 3, 1988 are considered family homes and are prospectively entitled to the benefits accorded to a family home under the Family Code. (Kelley, Jr. v. Planters Products, Inc., G.R. No. 172263, July 9, 2008, 557 SCRA 499)

When is the family home deemed constituted?

The family home is deemed constituted on a house and lot from the time it is occupied as a family residence. From the time of its constitution and so long as any of its beneficiaries actually resides therein, the family home continues to be such and is exempt from execution, forced sale or attachment except as hereinafter provided and to the extent of the value allowed by law. (Art. 153, Family Code)

May a family home be constituted on a house without the land on which it is erected?

No. It is submitted that a family home may not be constituted without including the land on which it is erected. From the very definition of a family home enunciated in Art. 156 of the Family Code, it is clear that the land on which the house is erected is an integral part of a family home. Besides, there is a clear implication both from the definition and purpose of such family home as well as from the provisions of the Civil Code as amended by the Family Code regulating said home that is permanent in character. Now, if a house constructed on a rented land, for instance, maybe constituted into a family home, it becomes temporary. It cannot, therefore, serve the purpose of a family home. (Jurado, Civil Law Reviewer, 2006 ed., page 200-201)

May a property that is subject of a conditional sale be constituted a family home?

Yes. The second paragraph of Article 156 of the Family Code provides: "Nevertheless, property that is the subject of a conditional sale on installments where ownership is reserved by the vendor only to guarantee payment of the purchase price may be constituted as a family home."

On what properties must the family home be constituted?

The family home must be part of the properties of the absolute community or the conjugal partnership, or of the exclusive properties of either spouse with the latter's consent.

The family home may also be constituted by an unmarried head of a family on his or her own property.  (Art. 156, Family Code)

Who may constitute a family home?

The family home may be constituted jointly by the husband and the wife or by an unmarried head of a family. (Art. 152, Family Code)

What is a family home?

The family home, constituted jointly by the husband and the wife or by an unmarried head of a family, is the dwelling house where they and their family reside, and the land on which it is situated. (Art. 152, Family Code)

May a wife compel her husband to live with her in their conjugal dwelling?

Article 68 of the Family Code states: "The husband and wife are obliged to live together, observe mutual love, respect and fidelity, and render mutual help and support." Since living together and observing mutual love, respect and fidelity are obligations under the law, the question is, can a wife or husband legally compel his or her spouse to come home and comply with such obligations? This was answered in the case of:

Ilusorio vs. Bildner

 GR No. 139789, May 12, 2000; 332 SCRA 169

Facts: Potenciano Ilusorio, a lawyer, is about 86 years of age possessed of extensive property valued at millions of pesos. For many years, he was Chairman of the Board and President of Baguio Country Club. In 1942, he married Erlinda Kalaw. They lived together for a period of thirty (30) years until they separated from bed and board in 1972 for undisclosed reasons. Potenciano lived at Makati every time he was in Manila and at Illusorio Penthouse, Baguio Country Club when he was in Baguio City.  Erlinda, on the other hand, lived in Antipolo City. 

In 1997, upon Potenciano’s arrival from the United States, he stayed with Erlinda for about five (5) months in Antipolo City. The children, Sylvia and Erlinda Ilusorio Bildner, alleged that during this time, their mother gave Potenciano an overdose of 200 mg instead of 100 mg Zoloft, an antidepressant drug prescribed by his doctor. As a consequence, Potenciano’s health deteriorated.

On May 31, 1998, after attending a corporate meeting in Baguio City, Potenciano did not return to Antipolo City and instead lived in Makati. Erlinda filed with the CA a petition for habeas corpus to have the custody of Potenciano alleging that respondents Sylvia and Bildner refused her demands to see and visit Potenciano. The CA allowed visitation rights to Erlinda for humanitarian consideration  but denied the petition for habeas corpus.

Issue: May a wife secure a writ of habeas corpus to compel her husband to live with her in their conjugal dwelling?

Held: No. a writ of habeas corpus extends to all cases of illegal confinement or detention, or by which the rightful custody of a person is withheld from the one entitled thereto. To justify the grant of the petition, the restraint of liberty must be an illegal and involuntary deprivation of freedom of action. The illegal restraint of liberty must be actual and effective, not merely nominal or moral.

The evidence shows that there was no actual and effective detention or deprivation of lawyer Potenciano Ilusorio’s liberty that would justify the issuance of the writ. The fact that Potenciano Ilusorio is about 86 years of age, or under medication does not necessarily render him mentally incapacitated. Soundness of mind does not hinge on age or medical condition but on the capacity of the individual to discern his actions.

With his full mental capacity coupled with the right of choice, Potenciano Ilusorio may not be the subject of visitation rights against his free choice. Otherwise, we will deprive him of his right to privacy. Needless to say, this will run against his fundamental constitutional right. 

The Court of Appeals missed the fact that the case did not involve the right of a parent to visit a minor child but the right of a wife to visit a husband. In case the husband refuses to see his wife for private reasons, he is at liberty to do so without threat of any penalty attached to the exercise of his right.

No court is empowered as a judicial authority to compel a husband to live with his wife. Coverture cannot be enforced by compulsion of a writ of habeas corpus carried out by sheriffs or by any other mesne process. That is a matter beyond judicial authority and is best left to the man and woman’s free choice.

How does the Family Code define “family”?

The family, being the foundation of the nation, is a basic social institution which public policy cherishes and protects. Consequently, family relations are governed by law and no custom, practice or agreement destructive of the family shall be recognized or given effect. (Art. 149, Family Code)

What relationships are included under the term “family relations”?

Family relations include those: 

(1) Between husband and wife; 

(2) Between parents and children; 

(3) Among other ascendants and descendants; and

(4) Among brothers and sisters, whether of the full or half-blood. (Art. 150)

What is the requirement if there are suits between members of the same family? What is the reason behind the requirement?

If suit is between members of the same family, there must be prior earnest efforts toward a compromise; otherwise, the came must be dismissed. 

"No suit between members of the same family shall prosper unless it should appear from the verified complaint or petition that earnest efforts toward a compromise have been made, but that the same have failed. If it is shown that no such efforts were in fact made, the same case must be dismissed. This rule shall not apply to cases which may not be the subject of compromise under the Civil Code." (Art. 151, FC)

The reason for the law is that a lawsuit between family members generates deeper bitterness than one between strangers.  Hence, it is necessary that every effort should be made towards a compromise before a litigation is allowed to breed hate and passion in the family. (Esquivas vs. CA, G.R. No. 119714, May 29, 1997)

What does "members of the same family mean"? Is there a need for efforts to compromise if there is a stranger to the suit between members of the same family?

The phrase "members of the same family"in Art. 151 of the Family Code must be understood as referring to the relations enumerated in Art. 150 of the Family Code under which "family relations" include only those (a) between husband and wife, (b) between parent and child, (c) among other ascendants and their descendants, and (d) among brothers and sisters. Hence, if there is a stranger to the suit, such as a brother-in-law or a sister-in-law, compliance with Article 151 is not jurisdictional for the maintenance of the action. 

"Efforts to compromise" are not a jurisdictional prerequisite for the maintenance of an action whenever a stranger to the family is a party thereto, whether as necessary or indispensable one.  An alien to the family may not be willing to suffer the inconvenience of, much less relish, the delay and the complications that wranglings between and among relatives more often than not entail.  Besides, it is neither practical nor fair that the rights of a family be made to depend on a stranger who just happens to have innocently acquired some interest in a property by virtue of his affinity to the parties. ((Esquivas vs. CA, G.R. No. 119714, May 29, 1997 citing Magbenta vs. Gonong, No. L-44903, 22 April 1977, 76 SCRA 511)

Enumerate the cases which may not be subject of compromise

No compromise upon the following questions shall be valid:

(1) The civil status of a person;

(2) The validity of a marriage or legal separation;

(3) Any ground for legal separation;

(4) Future support;

(5) The jurisdiction of courts;

(6) Future legitime. (Art. 2035, Civil Code)

What is legitimation?

Legitimation is a remedy by means of which those who in fact were not born in wedlock and should, therefore, be considered illegitimate, are, by fiction, considered legitimate, it being supposed that they were born when their parents were already validly married. (1 Manresa 550, as cited on p. 251, Handbook on Family Code of the Philippines, Alicia V. Sempio-Diy)

Who may be legitimated?

Only children conceived and born outside of wedlock of parents who, at the time of conception of the former, were not disqualified by any impediment to marry each other, or were so disqualified only because either or both of them were below eighteen (18) years of age, may be legitimated. (Art. 177, FC as amended by RA 9858)

Children born of adulterous relationships, incestuous marriages, bigamous or polygamous marriages as well as marriages which are void from the beginning for reasons of public policy may not be legitimated. 

What requisites must concur in order that a child may be legitimated?

In order that a child may be legitimated, the following requisites must concur:

1. At the time of conception of the child, his/her parents were not disqualified by any impediment to marry each other;

2. The child is conceived and born outside of wedlock;

3. After the birth of the child, his/her parents subsequently got married; and,

4. Such marriage is not void ab initio. 

How shall legitimation take place?

Legitimation shall take place by a subsequent valid marriage between parents. (Art. 178, FC)

Will the annulment of a voidable marriage affect the legitimation of the child?

The annulment of a voidable marriage shall not affect the legitimation. (Art. 178, FC) 

The subsequent marriage of the parents must not be void ab initio, otherwise, legitimation shall not take place. If the marriage is simply voidable, the annulment of such marriage shall not affect the legitimation. 

What rights shall be enjoyed by legitimated children?

Legitimated children shall enjoy the same rights as legitimate children. (Art. 179, FC) Prior to the marriage of the parents, the status of the child is illegitimate. Upon the celebration of the marriage between the child's parents, the status of the child is ipso jure raised to legitimate status. 

When shall legitimation take effect?

The effects of legitimation shall retroact to the time of the child's birth. (Art. 180, FC) If the child dies prior to the marriage of his/her parents, the subsequent marriage of his/her parents shall nonetheless benefit his/her descendants. 

What is the effect on the legitimation of the child should the child die before the celebration of the marriage?

The legitimation of children who died before the celebration of the marriage shall benefit their descendants. (Art. 181, FC)

Who may impugn legitimation?

Legitimation may be impugned only by those who are prejudiced in their rights (Art. 182, FC). The rights referred to are successional rights. Hence, only those whose successional rights are directly affected may impugn legitimation that took place. 

Within what time may the impugnation of the legitimation be made?

Within five (5) years from the time of death of either of the parents of the child from whom the plaintiff/petitioner is a compulsory or intestate heir. (Art. 182, FC)

Llaneta vs. Agrava Case Digest

Llaneta vs. Agrava

GR No. 32054, May 15, 1974

Facts: Atanacia Llaneta was married with Serafin Ferrer whom she had a child named Victoriano Ferrer. Serafin died and about four years later Atanacia had a relationship with another man out of which Teresita Llaneta, herein petitioner, was born. All of them lived with Serafin’s mother in Manila. Teresita was raised in the household of the Ferrer’s using the surname of Ferrer in all her dealings throughout her schooling. When she was 21 years old, she applied for a copy of her birth certificate in Sorsogon as it is required to be presented in connection with a scholarship grant. It was then that she discovered that her registered surname was Llaneta and that she was the illegitimate child of Atanacia and an unknown father.  

She then filed a petition for change of name from Teresita Llaneta to Teresita Llaneta Ferrer on the ground that her use thenceforth of the surname Llaneta, instead of Ferrer, which she had been using, would cause untold difficulties and confusion. After trial, the respondent judge denied the petition on the ground that the change of name would give the false impression that Teresita is a legitimate daughter of Serafin. 

Issue:  Whether Teresita can have her surname changed to Ferrer.

Held: Yes. The petitioner has established that she has been using the surname Ferrer for as long as she can remember; that all her records in school and elsewhere, put her name down as Teresita Ferrer; that her friends and associates know her only as Teresita Ferrer; and that even the late Serafin Ferrer's nearest of kin have tolerated and still approve of her use of the surname Ferrer. Indeed, a sudden shift at this time by the petitioner to the name of Teresita Llaneta (in order to conform to that appearing in the birth certificate) would result in confusion among the persons and entities she deals with and entail endless and vexatious explanations of the circumstances of her new name. 

The principle that disallows change of name as would give the false impression of family relationship, relied by the respondent judge, remains valid but only to the extent that the proposed change of name would in great probability cause prejudice or future mischief to the family whose surname it is that is involved or to the community in general. In the case at bar, however, the late Serafin Ferrer's widowed mother, Victoria, and his two remaining brothers, Nehemias and Ruben, have come forward in earnest support of the petition. Adequate publication of the proceeding has not elicited the slightest opposition from the relatives and friends of the late Serafin Ferrer. The State (represented by the Solicitor General's Office), which has an interest in the name borne by every citizen within its realm for purposes of identification, interposed no opposition at the trial after a searching cross-examination, of Teresita and her witnesses. It is beyond cavil that those living who possess the right of action to prevent the surname Ferrer from being smeared are proud to share it with Teresita.

Laperal vs. Republic Case Digest

Laperal vs. Republic

GR No. L-18008, October 30, 1962

Facts: In 1958, petitioner Elisea L. Santamaria was decreed legally separated from her husband Enrique R. Santamaria. In 1960, she filed a petition to be allowed to change her name and/or be permitted to resume using her maiden name Elisea Laperal.  The City Attorney of Baguio opposed the petition on the ground that the same violates the provisions of Article 370 (should be 372) of the Civil Code, and that it is not sanctioned by the Rules of Court.

The court denied the petition. Upon petitioner's motion, however, the court, treating the petition as one for change of name, reconsidered its decision and granted the petition on the ground that to allow petitioner, who is a businesswoman decreed legally separated from her husband, to continue using her married name would give rise to confusion in her finances and the eventual liquidation of the conjugal assets. Hence, this appeal by the State.

Issue:

Should petitioner be allowed to change her name or be permitted to resume using her maiden name?

Held: No. Article 372 of the Civil Code reads:

ART. 372. When legal separation has been granted, the wife shall continue using her name and surname employed before the legal separation. 

The language of the statute is mandatory that the wife, even after the legal separation has been decreed, shall continue using her name and surname employed before the legal separation. This is so because her married status is unaffected by the separation, there being no severance of the vinculum. It seems to be the policy of the law that the wife should continue to use the name indicative of her unchanged status for the benefit of all concerned.

Even applying Rule 103, the fact of legal separation alone — which is the only basis for the petition — is, not a sufficient ground to justify a change of the name of petitioner, for to hold otherwise would be to provide an easy circumvention of the mandatory provisions of Article 372.

The finding that petitioner’s continued use of her husband surname may cause undue confusion in her finances was without basis.  It must be considered that the issuance of the decree of legal separation in 1958, necessitate that the conjugal partnership between her and Enrique had automatically been dissolved and liquidated. Hence, there could be no more occasion for an eventual liquidation of the conjugal assets.