Republic vs Miller Case Digest

Republic vs Claude A. Miller and Jumrus E. Miller
G.R. No. 125932.  April 21, 1999

Facts: On July 29, 1988, Spouses Miller, both American citizens, filed with the RTC, Angeles City a verified petition to adopt Michael Magno Madayag, a Filipino child, under the provision of the Child and Youth Welfare Code which allows aliens to adopt.  The natural parents executed affidavits giving their irrevocable consent to the adoption and the DSWD recommended approval of the petition on the basis of its evaluation. On May 12, 1989, the trial court rendered decision granting the petition for adoption.

On August 3, 1998, the Family Code became effective, prohibiting the adoption of a Filipino child by aliens.

The Solicitor General appealed to the granting of the petition for adoption by the RTC.

Issue: 

Whether or not aliens may be allowed to adopt a Filipino child when the petition for adoption was filed prior to the effectivity of the Family Code prohibiting the same.

Held:

Yes. An alien qualified to adopt under the Child and Youth Welfare Code, which was in force at the time of the filing of the petition, acquired a vested right which could not be affected by the subsequent enactment of a new law disqualifying him.

The enactment of the Family Code, effective August 3, 1988, will not impair the right of respondents who are aliens to adopt a Filipino child because the right has become vested at the time of filing of the petition for adoption and shall be governed by the law then in force. A vested right is one whose existence, effectivity and extent does not depend upon events foreign to the will of the holder.  Vested rights include not only legal or equitable title to the enforcement of a demand, but also an exemption from new obligations created after the right has vested.

As long as the petition for adoption was sufficient in form and substance in accordance with the law in governance at the time it was filed, the court acquires jurisdiction and retains it until it fully disposes of the case.  To repeat, the jurisdiction of the court is determined by the statute in force at the time of the commencement of the action.  Such jurisdiction of a court, whether in criminal or civil cases, once it attaches cannot be ousted by a subsequent happenings or events, although of a character which would have prevented jurisdiction from attaching in the first instance.

Therefore, an alien who filed a petition for adoption before the effectivity of the Family code, although denied the right to adopt under Art. 184 of said Code, may continue with his petition under the law prevailing before the Family Code.

Adoption statutes, being humane and salutary, hold the interests and welfare of the child to be of paramount consideration.  They are designed to provide homes, parental care and education for unfortunate, needy or orphaned children and give them the protection of society and family in the person of the adopter, as well as childless couples or persons to experience the joy of parenthood and give them legally a child in the person of the adopted for the manifestation of their natural parent instincts.  Every reasonable intendment should be sustained to promote and fulfill these noble and compassionate objectives of the law.

In Re Petition for Adoption of Michelle Lim and Michael Lim

In Re Petition for Adoption of Michelle Lim and Michael Lim

Facts: Spouses Monina P. Lim and Primo Lim were childless. Subsequently, two minor children, whose parents were unknown, were entrusted to them by a certain Lucia Ayuban. Being so eager to have children of their own, Monina and Primo registered the children to make it appear that they were the children’s parents. The children were named Michelle P. Lim and Michael Jude P. Lim. The spouses reared and cared for the children as if they were their own. Unfortunately, in 1998, Primo died. On 27 December 2000, Monina married Angel Olario, an American citizen. 

Monina decided to adopt the children by availing of the amnesty given under RA 8552 to individuals who simulated the birth of a child.  In 2002, she filed separate petitions for adoption of Michelle and Michael before the trial court. Michelle was then 25 years old and already married and Michael was 18 years and seven months old. Michelle and her husband, Michael and Olario gave their consent to the adoption as evidenced by their Affidavits of Consent.

On 15 September 2004, the trial court rendered judgment dismissing the petitions. The trial court ruled that since Monina had remarried, she should have filed the petition jointly with her new husband.

Monina appealed contending that the rule on joint adoption must be relaxed because it is the duty of the court and the State to protect the paramount interest and welfare of the child to be adopted. Petitioner argues that the legal maxim “dura lex sed lex” is not applicable to adoption cases. She argues that joint parental authority is not necessary in  this case since, at the time the petitions were filed, Michelle was 25 years old and already married, while Michael was already 18 years of age. Parental authority is not anymore necessary since they have been emancipated having attained the age of majority.

Issues: 

1. Whether or not petitioner, who has remarried, can singly adopt.

2. Whether or not joint parental authority is not anymore necessary since the children have been emancipated having reached the age of majority.

Held:

1. No. The law is explicit. Husband and wife shall jointly adopt except in the following cases: 

(i) if one spouse seeks to adopt the legitimate son/daughter of the other; or 

(ii) if one spouse seeks to adopt his/her own illegitimate son/daughter: Provided, however, That the other spouse has signified his/her consent thereto; or 

(iii) if the spouses are legally separated from each other, which was not present in the case at bar. 

The use of the word “shall” means that  joint adoption by the husband and the wife is mandatory. This is in consonance with the concept of joint parental authority over the child which is the ideal situation. As the child to be adopted is elevated to the level of a legitimate child, it is but natural to require the spouses to adopt jointly. The rule also insures harmony between the spouses. Since the petitions for adoption were filed only by petitioner herself, without joining her husband, Olario, the trial court was correct in denying the petitions for adoption on this ground.

Neither does petitioner fall under any of the three exceptions enumerated in Section 7. First, the children to be adopted are not the legitimate children of petitioner or of her husband Olario. Second, the children are not the illegitimate children of  petitioner. And third, petitioner and Olario are not legally separated from each other.

The fact that Olario gave his consent to the adoption as shown in his Affidavit of Consent does not suffice. There are certain requirements that Olario must comply being an American citizen. He must meet the qualifications set forth in Section 7 of RA 8552 such as: (1) he must prove that his country has diplomatic relations with the Republic of the Philippines; (2) he must have been living in the Philippines for at least three continuous years prior to the filing of the application for adoption; (3) he must maintain such residency until the adoption decree is entered; (4) he has legal capacity to adopt in his own country; and (5) the adoptee is allowed to enter the adopter’s country as the latter’s adopted child. None of these qualifications were shown and proved during the trial.

These requirements on residency and certification of the alien’s qualification to adopt cannot likewise be waived pursuant to Section 7. The children or adoptees are not relatives within the fourth degree of consanguinity or affinity of petitioner or of Olario. Neither are the adoptees the legitimate children of petitioner.

2. Petitioner's contention is untenable. Parental authority includes caring for and rearing the children for civic consciousness and efficiency and the development of their moral, mental and physical character and well-being. The father and the mother shall jointly exercise parental authority over the persons of their common children. Even the remarriage of the surviving parent shall not affect the parental authority over the children, unless the court appoints another person to be the guardian of the person or property of the children.

It is true that when the child reaches the age of emancipation — that is, when he attains the age of majority or 18 years of age —  emancipation terminates parental authority over the person and property of the child, who shall then be qualified and responsible for all acts of civil life.  However,   parental authority is merely just one of the effects of legal adoption. 

Even if emancipation terminates parental authority, the adoptee is still considered a legitimate child of the adopter with all the  rights of a legitimate child such as: (1) to bear the surname of the father and the mother; (2) to receive support from their parents; and (3) to be entitled to the legitime and other successional rights. Conversely, the adoptive parents shall, with respect to the adopted child, enjoy all the benefits to which biological parents are entitled such as support and successional rights. 

Alcantara vs. Alcantara Case Digest

Alcantara vs. Alcantara 

G.R. No. 167746, August 28, 2007

Facts: Restituto M. Alcantara filed a petition for annulment of marriage against respondent Rosita A. Alcantara alleging that on 8 December 1982 he and respondent, without securing the required marriage license, went to the Manila City Hall for the purpose of looking for a person who could arrange a marriage for them. They met a person who, for a fee, arranged their wedding before a certain priest. They got married on the same day. They went through another marriage ceremony in a church in Tondo, Manila, on 26 March 1983. The marriage was likewise celebrated without the parties securing a marriage license. The alleged marriage license, procured in Carmona, Cavite, appearing on the marriage contract, is a sham, as neither party was a resident of Carmona, and they never went to Carmona to apply for a license. In 1988, they parted ways and lived separate lives. Petitioner prayed that after due hearing, judgment be issued declaring their marriage void and ordering the Civil Registrar to cancel the corresponding marriage contract and its entry on file.  

Rosita asserted the validity of their marriage and maintained that there was a marriage license issued as evidenced by a certification from the Office of the Civil Registry of Carmona, Cavite. Petitioner has a mistress with whom he has three children. Petitioner only filed the annulment of their marriage to evade prosecution for concubinage. 

After hearing, the trial court dismissed the petition for lack of merit. The CA affirmed the decision.

Issue:  Was there an absence of marriage license that would render the marriage between petitioner and respondent void ab initio?

Held: No. A valid marriage license is a requisite of marriage, the absence of which renders the marriage void ab initio. The requirement and issuance of a marriage license is the State’s demonstration of its involvement and participation in every marriage, in the maintenance of which the general public is interested.

To be considered void on the ground of absence of a marriage license, the law requires that the absence of such marriage license must be apparent on the marriage contract, or at the very least, supported by a certification from the local civil registrar that no such marriage license was issued to the parties.  In this case, the marriage contract between the petitioner and respondent reflects a marriage license number. A certification to this effect was also issued by the local civil registrar of Carmona, Cavite. The certification moreover is precise in that it specifically identified the parties to whom the marriage license was issued, namely Restituto Alcantara and Rosita Almario, further validating the fact that a license was in fact issued to the parties herein. This certification enjoys the presumption that official duty has been regularly performed and the issuance of the marriage license was done in the regular conduct of official business. Hence, petitioner cannot insist on the absence of a marriage license to impugn the validity of his marriage. 

Petitioner, in a faint attempt to demolish the probative value of the marriage license, claims that neither he nor respondent is a resident of Carmona, Cavite.  Even then, we still hold that there is no sufficient basis to annul petitioner and respondent’s marriage. Issuance of a marriage license in a city or municipality, not the residence of either of the contracting parties, and issuance of a marriage license despite the absence of publication or prior to the completion of the 10-day period for publication are considered mere irregularities that do not affect the validity of the marriage.  An irregularity in any of the formal requisites of marriage does not affect its validity but the party or parties responsible for the irregularity are civilly, criminally and administratively liable.

Likewise, the issue raised by petitioner -- that they appeared before a “fixer” who arranged everything for them and who facilitated the ceremony before a certain priest -- will not strengthen his posture.  The authority of the officer or clergyman shown to have performed a marriage ceremony will be presumed in the absence of any showing to the contrary. Moreover, the solemnizing officer is not duty-bound to investigate whether or not a marriage license has been duly and regularly issued by the local civil registrar. All the solemnizing officer needs to know is that the license has been issued by the competent official, and it may be presumed from the issuance of the license that said official has fulfilled the duty to ascertain whether the contracting parties had fulfilled the requirements of law.

Anaya vs. Palaroan Case Digest

Anaya vs. Palaroan

G.R. No. L-27930, November 26, 1970

Facts: On 7 January 1954, after one month of marriage to Aurora Anaya, Fernando Palaroan filed a complaint to annul it on the ground that his consent was obtained through force and intimidation. The court dismissed the complaint and granted Aurora's counterclaim. While the amount of the counterclaim was being negotiated, Fernando allegedly divulged that several months prior to the marriage, he had pre-marital relationships with a close relative of his. Anaya filed suit to annul the marriage and to recover moral damages. 

Fernando denied having had pre-marital relationship with a close relative and having committed any fraud against Aurora. He did not pray for the dismissal of the complaint but for its dismissal "with respect to the alleged moral damages." Aurora replied stating that Fernando had no intention of performing his marital duties and obligations since the marriage was contracted as a means for him to escape marrying the close relative that was intimated above. The trial court dismissed the complaint, holding that Aurora's allegation of the fraud was legally insufficient to invalidate her marriage. Aurora appealed. 

Issue:  Is non-disclosure to a wife by her husband of his pre-marital relationship with another woman a ground for annulment of marriage?

Held: No. Non-disclosure of a husband's pre-marital relationship with another woman is not one of the enumerated circumstances that would constitute a ground for annulment; and it is further excluded by the last paragraph of the article, providing that "no other misrepresentation or deceit as to ... chastity" shall give ground for an action to annul a marriage. While a woman may detest such non-disclosure of premarital lewdness or feel having been thereby cheated into giving her consent to the marriage, nevertheless the law does not assuage her grief after her consent was solemnly given, for upon marriage she entered into an institution in which society, and not herself alone, is interested. The lawmaker's intent being plain, the Court's duty is to give effect to the same, whether it agrees with the rule or not. 

Wassmer vs. Velez Case Digest

Wassmer vs. Velez
G.R. No. L-20089, December 26, 1964
12 SCRA 648

Facts: Francisco Velez and Beatriz Wassmer applied for a Marriage License on August 23, 1954. The wedding was to take place on September 4, 1954. All the necessary preparations were undertaken for the said event. However, two days before the wedding, Francisco left a note for Beatriz informing her that the wedding will not push through because his mother opposed the union. The following day, he sent her a telegram stating that he will be returning very soon. Francisco never showed up and has not been heard since then. Beatriz subsequently sued Francisco for damages. The trial court ordered Francisco to pay Beatriz actual, moral and exemplary damages. 

Francisco filed a petition for relief from orders, judgment and proceedings and motion for new trial and reconsideration which was denied by the trial court. Francisco appealed to the Supreme Court, asserting that the judgment is contrary to law as there is no provision in the Civil Code authorizing an action for breach of promise to marry.  

Issue: May Francisco be held liable to pay Beatriz damages for breach of promise to marry?

Held: Yes. Francisco may be held liable under Article 21 of the Civil Code, which provides: "Any person who wilfully causes loss or injury to another in a manner that is contrary to morals, good customs or public policy shall compensate the latter for the damage."

Mere breach of promise to marry is not an actionable wrong. But to formally set a wedding and go through all the preparation and publicity, only to walk out of it when the matrimony is about to be solemnized, is quite different. Surely this is not a case of mere breach of promise to marry. This is palpably and unjustifiably contrary to good customs for which defendant must be held answerable in damages in accordance with Article 21.

Vda. De Chua vs. CA Case Digest

Vda. De Chua vs. CA

G.R. No. 116835 March 5, 1998

Facts: From 1970 up to 1981, Roberto Chua lived out of wedlock with private respondent Florita A. Vallejo and they begot two sons. On 28 May 1992, Roberto Chua died intestate in Davao City. 

On 2 July 1992, Vallejo filed with the Regional Trial Court of Cotabato City a petition for the guardianship and administration over the persons and properties of the two minors. 

Petitioner Antonietta Garcia Vda. de Chua, representing to be the surviving spouse of Roberto Chua, filed a Motion to Dismiss on the ground of improper venue. Petitioner alleged that at the time of the decedent’s death, Davao City was his residence, hence, the Regional Trial Court of Davao City is the proper forum. In support of her allegation, petitioner presented the following documents: (1) photocopy of the marriage contract; (2) Transfer Certificate of Title issued in the name of Roberto L. Chua married to Antonietta Garcia, and a resident of Davao City; (3) Residence Certificates from 1988 and 1989 issued at Davao City indicating that he was married and was born in Cotabato City; (4) Income Tax Returns for 1990 and 1991 filed in Davao City where the status of the decedent was stated as married; and, (5) Passport of the decedent specifying that he was married and his residence was Davao City.

Vallejo contends that movant/oppositor Antonietta Chua is not the surviving spouse of the late Roberto L. Chua but a pretender to the estate of the latter since the deceased never contracted marriage with any woman until he died.

The trial court ruled that petitioner has no personality to file the motion not having proven his status as a wife of the decedent. The Order was appealed to the CA, but it decided in favor of herein respondents.

Issue: Was petitioner able to prove her marriage to Roberto L. Chua?

Held: No. The best proof of marriage between a man and wife is a marriage contract which petitioner failed to produce. The lower court correctly disregarded the Photostat copy of the marriage certificate which she presented, this being a violation of the best evidence rule, together with other worthless pieces of evidence. Transfer Certificates of Title, Residence Certificates, passports and other similar documents cannot prove marriage especially so when the private respondent has submitted a certification from the Local Civil Registrar concerned that the alleged marriage was not registered and a letter from the judge alleged to have solemnized the marriage that he has not solemnized said alleged marriage. 

Who shall fix the family domicile? In case of disagreement, who shall decide?

The husband and wife shall fix the family domicile. In case of disagreement, the court shall decide. (Art. 69, FC)

In what cases shall the system of complete separation of property govern the property relations between the spouses?

The system of complete separation of property shall govern the property relations between the spouses only in the following cases:

1. When it is expressly provided for in the marriage settlements (Arts 134 and 74, FC);

2. When it is so declared by a competent court (Art. 134, FC); and,

3. When the surviving spouse failed to liquidate the absolute community or conjugal partnership of gains of a previous marriage which has been terminated by death within the one-year period required by law prior to contracting another marriage. The subsequent marriage is mandatorily governed by a regime of complete separation. (Arts. 103 and 130, FC) 

When does Article 148 of the Family Code applies?

Article 148 of the Family Code applies in cases where the parties in union are incapacitated to marry each other. It refers to the property regime of bigamous marriages, adulterous relationships, relationships in a state of concubine, relationships where both man and woman are married to other persons, multiple alliances of the same married man. (Cariño vs. Cariño, G.R. No. 132529.  February 2, 2001)

What rule governs the property relations where one of the parties has legal impediment to marry the other?

When the parties spouses suffer from a legal impediment to marry or when they do not live exclusively with each other as husband and wife, the provisions of Article 148 of the Family Code apply, where only the properties acquired by both of the parties through their actual joint contribution of money, property, or industry shall be owned by them in common in proportion to their respective contributions. Proof of actual contribution is required, unlike in situations covered by Article 147. In the absence of proof of extent of the parties’ respective contribution, their share are presumed to be equal. The same rule and presumption shall apply to joint deposits of money and evidences of credit.

If one of the parties is validly married to another, his or her share in the co-ownership shall accrue to the absolute community or conjugal partnership existing in such valid marriage. If the party who acted in bad faith is not validly married to another, his or her shall be forfeited in the manner provided in the last paragraph of the preceding Article.

The foregoing rules on forfeiture shall likewise apply even if both parties are in bad faith. (Agapay vs. Palang, G.R. No. 116668 July 28 1997; Article 148, FC)

Discuss the requirement of proof of "actual joint contribution" and the presumption of "equality of contribution" under Art. 148 of the Family Code

A reading of Article 148 readily shows that there must be proof of “actual joint contribution” by both the live-in partners before the property becomes co-owned by them in proportion to their contribution.  The presumption of equality of contribution arises only in the absence of proof of their proportionate contributions, subject to the condition that actual joint contribution is proven first.  Simply put, proof of actual contribution by both parties is required, otherwise there is no co-ownership and no presumption of equal sharing. (Villanueva vs. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 143286.  April 14, 2004)

Does Article 148, FC apply retroactively?

Although the adulterous cohabitation of the parties or the acquisition of the property occurred before the effectivity of the Family Code on August 3, 1998, Article 148 applies because this provision was intended precisely to fill up the hiatus in Article 144 of the Civil Code.  Before Article 148 of the Family Code was enacted, there was no provision governing property relations of couples living in a state of adultery or concubinage.  (Atienza vs. De Castro, G.R. No. 169698, November 29, 2006)

What are donations by reason of marriage?

Donations by reason of marriage or donation propter nuptias, as stated in Article 82 of the Family code, are those which are made before its celebration, in consideration of the same, and in favor of one or both of the future spouses. 

What are the requisites for a valid donation propter nuptias?

For a donation propter nuptias to be valid, the donation must be made: (BOC)

1. Before the celebration of the marriage;

2. In consideration of the marriage; and

3. In favor of one or both of the future spouses. 

What are the distinctions between donations by reason of marriage and ordinary donations?

Donation Propter Nuptias	Ordinary Donations
As to formalities, it is governed by the rules on ordinary donations except that if future property is donated, it must conform with the formalities of wills.	It is governed by the rules on donations (Articles 725- 773, NCC)
As to extent, both present and future properties may be donated	Only present properties may be donated
As to acceptance, donation propter nuptias does not require express acceptance.	As a general rule, express acceptance is necessary.
As to revocation,  the grounds are found in Article 86 of the Family Code	Grounds are found in the law on donations.

What are the formalities required in donations propter nuptias?

1. PRESENT PROPERTY - 

A. PERSONAL PROPERTY - If what is donated is a personal property the value of which exceeds P5,000.00, the donation and acceptance must both be in writing; otherwise, the donation is void.

B. REAL PROPERTY - If what is donated is a real property, the donation and acceptance must both be in public instrument; otherwise, the donation is void.

2. FUTURE PROPERTY - If what is donated is a future property, the donation must be in the form of wills. 

Can property subject to encumbrances be donated?

Donations by reason of marriage of property subject to encumbrances shall be valid. In case of foreclosure of the encumbrance and the property is sold for less than the total amount of the obligation secured, the donee shall not be liable for the deficiency. If the property is sold for more than the total amount of said obligation, the donee shall be entitled to the excess. (Art. 85, FC)

What are the grounds for revoking a donation by reason of marriage?

A donation by reason of marriage may be revoked by the donor on the following grounds:

(1) If the marriage is not celebrated or judicially declared void ab initio except donations made in the marriage settlements, which shall be governed by Article 81;

(2) When the marriage takes place without the consent of the parents or guardian, as required by law;

(3) When the marriage is annulled, and the donee acted in bad faith;

(4) Upon legal separation, the donee being the guilty spouse;

(5) If it is with a resolutory condition and the condition is complied with;

(6) When the donee has committed an act of ingratitude as specified by the provisions of the Civil Code on donations in general.  (Art. 86, FC)

Are donations made by either spouse in favor of the other during the marriage valid?

Every donation or grant of gratuitous advantage, direct or indirect, between the spouses during the marriage shall be void. (Art. 87, FC) 

Why are donations between the spouses during the marriage prohibited?

Donations between spouses during marriage are prohibited. And this is so because if transfers or conveyances between spouses were allowed during marriage, that would destroy the system of conjugal partnership, a basic policy in civil law. It was also designed to prevent the exercise of undue influence by one spouse over the other, as well as to protect the institution of marriage, which is the cornerstone of family law. (Ching vs. Goyanko, Jr., G.R. No. 165879, November 10, 2006)

Are donations made by either spouse in favor of their step-children or persons of whom the other spouse is a presumptive heir during the marriage valid?

No. Donations made by either spouse in favor of the  children whom the other spouse had by another marriage (donations to step-children) or persons of whom the other spouse is a presumptive heir during the marriage is not valid because they constitute as an indirect donation to the other spouse which is prohibited by Art. 87 of the Family Code. 

What is the exception to the rule on donations during the marriage?

Every donation or grant of gratuitous advantage, direct or indirect, between the spouses during the marriage shall be void, except moderate gifts which the spouses may give each other on the occasion of any family rejoicing. (Art. 87, Family Code)

What is the extent of the prohibition on donations during the marriage and why?

Every donation or grant of gratuitous advantage, direct or indirect, between the spouses during the marriage shall be void, except moderate gifts which the spouses may give each other on the occasion of any family rejoicing. The prohibition shall also apply to persons living together as husband and wife without a valid marriage. (Art. 87)

The prohibitions apply to a couple living as husband and wife without benefit of marriage, otherwise, “the condition of those who incurred guilt would turn out to be better than those in legal union.” (Ching vs. Goyanko, Jr., G.R. No. 165879, November 10, 2006)

How many family homes can a person constitute or be a beneficiary of?

A person may constitute, or be the beneficiary of, only one family home for purposes of availing the benefits of a family home. (Art. 161, FC)

What happens if the person constituting the family home dies?

If there are beneficiaries who survive and are living in the family home, it will continue for 10 years, unless at the expiration of 10 years, there is still a minor beneficiary, in which case the family home continues until that beneficiary becomes of age. (Patricio vs. Dario, G.R. No. 170829, November 20, 2006)

The family home shall continue for a period of ten (10) years or for as long as there is a minor beneficiary. The heirs cannot partition the same unless the court finds compelling reasons therefor. This rule shall apply regardless of whoever owns the property or constituted the family home. (Art. 159, FC)

What is the duration of the exemption against execution enjoyed by the family home?

The exemption is effective from the time of the constitution of the family home as such, and lasts so long as any of its beneficiaries actually resides therein. (Art. 153, FC)

What are the requisites to be a beneficiary of the family home?

To be a beneficiary of the family home, three requisites must concur: 

(1) they must be among the relationships enumerated in Art. 154 of the Family Code; 

(2) they live in the family home; and 

(3) they are dependent for legal support upon the head of the family. (Patricio vs. Dario, G.R. No. 170829, November 20, 2006)

Who are the beneficiaries of the family home?

The beneficiaries of a family home are:

(1) The husband and wife, or an unmarried person who is the head of a family; and

(2) Their parents, ascendants, descendants, brothers and sisters, whether the relationship be legitimate or illegitimate, who are living in the family home and who depend upon the head of the family for legal support. (Art. 154,FC)

Can the family home be sold or otherwise alienated? Under what conditions?

The family home may be sold, alienated, donated, assigned or encumbered by the owner or owners thereof with the written consent of the person constituting the same, the latter's spouse, and a majority of the beneficiaries of legal age. In case of conflict, the court shall decide. (Art. 158, FC)

When should the protection against execution, forced sale or attachment enjoyed by the family home be invoked?

● At no other time can the status of a residential house as a family home can be set up and proved and its exemption from execution be claimed but before the sale thereof at public auction. (Sps. De Mesa v. Sps. Acero, G.R. No. 185064, 16 January 2012)

● While it is true that the family home is constituted on a house and lot from the time it is occupied as a family residence and is exempt from execution or forced sale under Article 153 of the Family Code, such claim for exemption should be set up and proved to the Sheriff before the sale of the property at public auction. Failure to do so would estop the party from later claiming the exemption. (Honrado v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 166333, November 25, 2005)

● The settled rule is that the right to exemption or forced sale under Article 153 of the Family Code is a personal privilege granted to the judgment debtor and as such, it must be claimed not by the sheriff, but by the debtor himself before the sale of the property at public auction. (Honrado v. Court of Appeals, ibid.)

What is the remedy of the judgment creditor if the value of the family home exceeds the maximum amount fixed by law?

When a creditor whose claims is not among those mentioned in Article 155 obtains a judgment in his favor, and he has reasonable grounds to believe that the family home is actually worth more than the maximum amount fixed in Article 157, he may apply to the court which rendered the judgment for an order directing the sale of the property under execution. The court shall so order if it finds that the actual value of the family home exceeds the maximum amount allowed by law as of the time of its constitution. If the increased actual value exceeds the maximum allowed in Article 157 and results from subsequent voluntary improvements introduced by the person or persons constituting the family home, by the owner or owners of the property, or by any of the beneficiaries, the same rule and procedure shall apply.

At the execution sale, no bid below the value allowed for a family home shall be considered. The proceeds shall be applied first to the amount mentioned in Article 157, and then to the liabilities under the judgment and the costs. The excess, if any, shall be delivered to the judgment debtor. (Art. 160, FC)

Up to what extent is the family home exempt from execution, forced sale or attachment?

Article 157 of the Family Code allows the exemption of the family home from execution, forced sale or attachment if its actual value does not exceed, at the time of its constitution, the amount of P300,000.00 in urban areas and P200,000.00 in rural areas, or such amounts as may be fixed by law. Should the value of the currency changes after the adoption of the Family Code, the value most favorable for the constitution of a family home shall be the basis of evaluation.

Urban areas are deemed to include chartered cities and municipalities whose annual income at least equals that legally required for chartered cities. All others are deemed to be rural areas. 

When is a family home not exempt from execution, forced sale or attachment?

Under Art. 155 of the FC, while the family home shall be exempt from execution, forced sale or attachment, it may not be so except for:

(1) nonpayment of taxes;

(2) debts incurred prior to the constitution of the family home;

(3) debts secured by mortgages on the premises before or after such constitution; and

(4) debts due to laborers, mechanics, architects, builders, materialmen and others who have rendered service or furnished material for the construction of the building.

What is the law regarding the exemption of a family home from execution, forced sale or attachment?

Under Art. 153 of the Family Code, from the time of the constitution and so long as any of the beneficiaries of the family home actually resides therein, the family home is exempt from execution, forced sale or attachment except as provided for in Art. 155 of the Family Code and to the extent of the value allowed by law. 

What are the rules on constitution of family homes for purposes of exemption from execution?

First, family residences constructed before the effectivity of the Family Code or before August 3, 1988 must be constituted as a family home either judicially or extrajudicially in accordance with the provisions of the Civil Code in order to be exempt from execution;

Second, family residences constructed after the effectivity of the Family Code on August 3, 1988 are automatically deemed to be family homes and thus exempt from execution from the time it was constituted and lasts as long as any of its beneficiaries actually resides therein;

Third, family residences which were not judicially or extrajudicially constituted as a family home prior to the effectivity of the Family Code, but were existing thereafter, are considered as family homes by operation of law and are prospectively entitled to the benefits accorded to a family home under the Family Code. (Sps. De Mesa v. Sps. Acero, G.R. No. 185064, 16 January 2012)

How is family home constituted?

Before the effectivity of the Family Code on August 3, 1988, a family home can constituted either judicially or extra-judicially as provided under Articles 225, 229-231 and 233 of the Civil Code. Judicial constitution of the family home requires the filing of a verified petition before the courts and the registration of the court’s order with the Registry of Deeds of the area where the property is located. Meanwhile, extrajudicial constitution is governed by Articles 240 to 242 of the Civil Code and involves the execution of a public instrument which must also be registered with the Registry of Property. (Sps. De Mesa v. Sps. Acero, G.R. No. 185064, 16 January 2012)

After the effectivity of the Family Code: Under the Family Code, a family home is deemed constituted on a house and lot from the time it is occupied as a family residence. There is no need to constitute the same judicially or extrajudicially as required in the Civil Code. (Modequillo vs. Breva, GR. No. 86355, May 31, 1990) All family homes constructed after the effectivity of the Family Code are constituted as such by operation of law. All existing family residences as of August 3, 1988 are considered family homes and are prospectively entitled to the benefits accorded to a family home under the Family Code. (Kelley, Jr. v. Planters Products, Inc., G.R. No. 172263, July 9, 2008, 557 SCRA 499)

When is the family home deemed constituted?

The family home is deemed constituted on a house and lot from the time it is occupied as a family residence. From the time of its constitution and so long as any of its beneficiaries actually resides therein, the family home continues to be such and is exempt from execution, forced sale or attachment except as hereinafter provided and to the extent of the value allowed by law. (Art. 153, Family Code)

May a family home be constituted on a house without the land on which it is erected?

No. It is submitted that a family home may not be constituted without including the land on which it is erected. From the very definition of a family home enunciated in Art. 156 of the Family Code, it is clear that the land on which the house is erected is an integral part of a family home. Besides, there is a clear implication both from the definition and purpose of such family home as well as from the provisions of the Civil Code as amended by the Family Code regulating said home that is permanent in character. Now, if a house constructed on a rented land, for instance, maybe constituted into a family home, it becomes temporary. It cannot, therefore, serve the purpose of a family home. (Jurado, Civil Law Reviewer, 2006 ed., page 200-201)

May a property that is subject of a conditional sale be constituted a family home?

Yes. The second paragraph of Article 156 of the Family Code provides: "Nevertheless, property that is the subject of a conditional sale on installments where ownership is reserved by the vendor only to guarantee payment of the purchase price may be constituted as a family home."

On what properties must the family home be constituted?

The family home must be part of the properties of the absolute community or the conjugal partnership, or of the exclusive properties of either spouse with the latter's consent.

The family home may also be constituted by an unmarried head of a family on his or her own property.  (Art. 156, Family Code)

Who may constitute a family home?

The family home may be constituted jointly by the husband and the wife or by an unmarried head of a family. (Art. 152, Family Code)

What is a family home?

The family home, constituted jointly by the husband and the wife or by an unmarried head of a family, is the dwelling house where they and their family reside, and the land on which it is situated. (Art. 152, Family Code)

May a wife compel her husband to live with her in their conjugal dwelling?

Article 68 of the Family Code states: "The husband and wife are obliged to live together, observe mutual love, respect and fidelity, and render mutual help and support." Since living together and observing mutual love, respect and fidelity are obligations under the law, the question is, can a wife or husband legally compel his or her spouse to come home and comply with such obligations? This was answered in the case of:

Ilusorio vs. Bildner

 GR No. 139789, May 12, 2000; 332 SCRA 169

Facts: Potenciano Ilusorio, a lawyer, is about 86 years of age possessed of extensive property valued at millions of pesos. For many years, he was Chairman of the Board and President of Baguio Country Club. In 1942, he married Erlinda Kalaw. They lived together for a period of thirty (30) years until they separated from bed and board in 1972 for undisclosed reasons. Potenciano lived at Makati every time he was in Manila and at Illusorio Penthouse, Baguio Country Club when he was in Baguio City.  Erlinda, on the other hand, lived in Antipolo City. 

In 1997, upon Potenciano’s arrival from the United States, he stayed with Erlinda for about five (5) months in Antipolo City. The children, Sylvia and Erlinda Ilusorio Bildner, alleged that during this time, their mother gave Potenciano an overdose of 200 mg instead of 100 mg Zoloft, an antidepressant drug prescribed by his doctor. As a consequence, Potenciano’s health deteriorated.

On May 31, 1998, after attending a corporate meeting in Baguio City, Potenciano did not return to Antipolo City and instead lived in Makati. Erlinda filed with the CA a petition for habeas corpus to have the custody of Potenciano alleging that respondents Sylvia and Bildner refused her demands to see and visit Potenciano. The CA allowed visitation rights to Erlinda for humanitarian consideration  but denied the petition for habeas corpus.

Issue: May a wife secure a writ of habeas corpus to compel her husband to live with her in their conjugal dwelling?

Held: No. a writ of habeas corpus extends to all cases of illegal confinement or detention, or by which the rightful custody of a person is withheld from the one entitled thereto. To justify the grant of the petition, the restraint of liberty must be an illegal and involuntary deprivation of freedom of action. The illegal restraint of liberty must be actual and effective, not merely nominal or moral.

The evidence shows that there was no actual and effective detention or deprivation of lawyer Potenciano Ilusorio’s liberty that would justify the issuance of the writ. The fact that Potenciano Ilusorio is about 86 years of age, or under medication does not necessarily render him mentally incapacitated. Soundness of mind does not hinge on age or medical condition but on the capacity of the individual to discern his actions.

With his full mental capacity coupled with the right of choice, Potenciano Ilusorio may not be the subject of visitation rights against his free choice. Otherwise, we will deprive him of his right to privacy. Needless to say, this will run against his fundamental constitutional right. 

The Court of Appeals missed the fact that the case did not involve the right of a parent to visit a minor child but the right of a wife to visit a husband. In case the husband refuses to see his wife for private reasons, he is at liberty to do so without threat of any penalty attached to the exercise of his right.

No court is empowered as a judicial authority to compel a husband to live with his wife. Coverture cannot be enforced by compulsion of a writ of habeas corpus carried out by sheriffs or by any other mesne process. That is a matter beyond judicial authority and is best left to the man and woman’s free choice.

How does the Family Code define “family”?

The family, being the foundation of the nation, is a basic social institution which public policy cherishes and protects. Consequently, family relations are governed by law and no custom, practice or agreement destructive of the family shall be recognized or given effect. (Art. 149, Family Code)

What relationships are included under the term “family relations”?

Family relations include those: 

(1) Between husband and wife; 

(2) Between parents and children; 

(3) Among other ascendants and descendants; and

(4) Among brothers and sisters, whether of the full or half-blood. (Art. 150)

What is the requirement if there are suits between members of the same family? What is the reason behind the requirement?

If suit is between members of the same family, there must be prior earnest efforts toward a compromise; otherwise, the came must be dismissed. 

"No suit between members of the same family shall prosper unless it should appear from the verified complaint or petition that earnest efforts toward a compromise have been made, but that the same have failed. If it is shown that no such efforts were in fact made, the same case must be dismissed. This rule shall not apply to cases which may not be the subject of compromise under the Civil Code." (Art. 151, FC)

The reason for the law is that a lawsuit between family members generates deeper bitterness than one between strangers.  Hence, it is necessary that every effort should be made towards a compromise before a litigation is allowed to breed hate and passion in the family. (Esquivas vs. CA, G.R. No. 119714, May 29, 1997)

What does "members of the same family mean"? Is there a need for efforts to compromise if there is a stranger to the suit between members of the same family?

The phrase "members of the same family"in Art. 151 of the Family Code must be understood as referring to the relations enumerated in Art. 150 of the Family Code under which "family relations" include only those (a) between husband and wife, (b) between parent and child, (c) among other ascendants and their descendants, and (d) among brothers and sisters. Hence, if there is a stranger to the suit, such as a brother-in-law or a sister-in-law, compliance with Article 151 is not jurisdictional for the maintenance of the action. 

"Efforts to compromise" are not a jurisdictional prerequisite for the maintenance of an action whenever a stranger to the family is a party thereto, whether as necessary or indispensable one.  An alien to the family may not be willing to suffer the inconvenience of, much less relish, the delay and the complications that wranglings between and among relatives more often than not entail.  Besides, it is neither practical nor fair that the rights of a family be made to depend on a stranger who just happens to have innocently acquired some interest in a property by virtue of his affinity to the parties. ((Esquivas vs. CA, G.R. No. 119714, May 29, 1997 citing Magbenta vs. Gonong, No. L-44903, 22 April 1977, 76 SCRA 511)

Enumerate the cases which may not be subject of compromise

No compromise upon the following questions shall be valid:

(1) The civil status of a person;

(2) The validity of a marriage or legal separation;

(3) Any ground for legal separation;

(4) Future support;

(5) The jurisdiction of courts;

(6) Future legitime. (Art. 2035, Civil Code)

What is legitimation?

Legitimation is a remedy by means of which those who in fact were not born in wedlock and should, therefore, be considered illegitimate, are, by fiction, considered legitimate, it being supposed that they were born when their parents were already validly married. (1 Manresa 550, as cited on p. 251, Handbook on Family Code of the Philippines, Alicia V. Sempio-Diy)

Who may be legitimated?

Only children conceived and born outside of wedlock of parents who, at the time of conception of the former, were not disqualified by any impediment to marry each other, or were so disqualified only because either or both of them were below eighteen (18) years of age, may be legitimated. (Art. 177, FC as amended by RA 9858)

Children born of adulterous relationships, incestuous marriages, bigamous or polygamous marriages as well as marriages which are void from the beginning for reasons of public policy may not be legitimated. 

What requisites must concur in order that a child may be legitimated?

In order that a child may be legitimated, the following requisites must concur:

1. At the time of conception of the child, his/her parents were not disqualified by any impediment to marry each other;

2. The child is conceived and born outside of wedlock;

3. After the birth of the child, his/her parents subsequently got married; and,

4. Such marriage is not void ab initio. 

How shall legitimation take place?

Legitimation shall take place by a subsequent valid marriage between parents. (Art. 178, FC)

Will the annulment of a voidable marriage affect the legitimation of the child?

The annulment of a voidable marriage shall not affect the legitimation. (Art. 178, FC) 

The subsequent marriage of the parents must not be void ab initio, otherwise, legitimation shall not take place. If the marriage is simply voidable, the annulment of such marriage shall not affect the legitimation. 

What rights shall be enjoyed by legitimated children?

Legitimated children shall enjoy the same rights as legitimate children. (Art. 179, FC) Prior to the marriage of the parents, the status of the child is illegitimate. Upon the celebration of the marriage between the child's parents, the status of the child is ipso jure raised to legitimate status. 

When shall legitimation take effect?

The effects of legitimation shall retroact to the time of the child's birth. (Art. 180, FC) If the child dies prior to the marriage of his/her parents, the subsequent marriage of his/her parents shall nonetheless benefit his/her descendants. 

What is the effect on the legitimation of the child should the child die before the celebration of the marriage?

The legitimation of children who died before the celebration of the marriage shall benefit their descendants. (Art. 181, FC)

Who may impugn legitimation?

Legitimation may be impugned only by those who are prejudiced in their rights (Art. 182, FC). The rights referred to are successional rights. Hence, only those whose successional rights are directly affected may impugn legitimation that took place. 

Within what time may the impugnation of the legitimation be made?

Within five (5) years from the time of death of either of the parents of the child from whom the plaintiff/petitioner is a compulsory or intestate heir. (Art. 182, FC)

Llaneta vs. Agrava Case Digest

Llaneta vs. Agrava

GR No. 32054, May 15, 1974

Facts: Atanacia Llaneta was married with Serafin Ferrer whom she had a child named Victoriano Ferrer. Serafin died and about four years later Atanacia had a relationship with another man out of which Teresita Llaneta, herein petitioner, was born. All of them lived with Serafin’s mother in Manila. Teresita was raised in the household of the Ferrer’s using the surname of Ferrer in all her dealings throughout her schooling. When she was 21 years old, she applied for a copy of her birth certificate in Sorsogon as it is required to be presented in connection with a scholarship grant. It was then that she discovered that her registered surname was Llaneta and that she was the illegitimate child of Atanacia and an unknown father.  

She then filed a petition for change of name from Teresita Llaneta to Teresita Llaneta Ferrer on the ground that her use thenceforth of the surname Llaneta, instead of Ferrer, which she had been using, would cause untold difficulties and confusion. After trial, the respondent judge denied the petition on the ground that the change of name would give the false impression that Teresita is a legitimate daughter of Serafin. 

Issue:  Whether Teresita can have her surname changed to Ferrer.

Held: Yes. The petitioner has established that she has been using the surname Ferrer for as long as she can remember; that all her records in school and elsewhere, put her name down as Teresita Ferrer; that her friends and associates know her only as Teresita Ferrer; and that even the late Serafin Ferrer's nearest of kin have tolerated and still approve of her use of the surname Ferrer. Indeed, a sudden shift at this time by the petitioner to the name of Teresita Llaneta (in order to conform to that appearing in the birth certificate) would result in confusion among the persons and entities she deals with and entail endless and vexatious explanations of the circumstances of her new name. 

The principle that disallows change of name as would give the false impression of family relationship, relied by the respondent judge, remains valid but only to the extent that the proposed change of name would in great probability cause prejudice or future mischief to the family whose surname it is that is involved or to the community in general. In the case at bar, however, the late Serafin Ferrer's widowed mother, Victoria, and his two remaining brothers, Nehemias and Ruben, have come forward in earnest support of the petition. Adequate publication of the proceeding has not elicited the slightest opposition from the relatives and friends of the late Serafin Ferrer. The State (represented by the Solicitor General's Office), which has an interest in the name borne by every citizen within its realm for purposes of identification, interposed no opposition at the trial after a searching cross-examination, of Teresita and her witnesses. It is beyond cavil that those living who possess the right of action to prevent the surname Ferrer from being smeared are proud to share it with Teresita.