Republic vs Miller Case Digest

Republic vs Claude A. Miller and Jumrus E. Miller
G.R. No. 125932.  April 21, 1999

Facts: On July 29, 1988, Spouses Miller, both American citizens, filed with the RTC, Angeles City a verified petition to adopt Michael Magno Madayag, a Filipino child, under the provision of the Child and Youth Welfare Code which allows aliens to adopt.  The natural parents executed affidavits giving their irrevocable consent to the adoption and the DSWD recommended approval of the petition on the basis of its evaluation. On May 12, 1989, the trial court rendered decision granting the petition for adoption.

On August 3, 1998, the Family Code became effective, prohibiting the adoption of a Filipino child by aliens.

The Solicitor General appealed to the granting of the petition for adoption by the RTC.

Issue: 

Whether or not aliens may be allowed to adopt a Filipino child when the petition for adoption was filed prior to the effectivity of the Family Code prohibiting the same.

Held:

Yes. An alien qualified to adopt under the Child and Youth Welfare Code, which was in force at the time of the filing of the petition, acquired a vested right which could not be affected by the subsequent enactment of a new law disqualifying him.

The enactment of the Family Code, effective August 3, 1988, will not impair the right of respondents who are aliens to adopt a Filipino child because the right has become vested at the time of filing of the petition for adoption and shall be governed by the law then in force. A vested right is one whose existence, effectivity and extent does not depend upon events foreign to the will of the holder.  Vested rights include not only legal or equitable title to the enforcement of a demand, but also an exemption from new obligations created after the right has vested.

As long as the petition for adoption was sufficient in form and substance in accordance with the law in governance at the time it was filed, the court acquires jurisdiction and retains it until it fully disposes of the case.  To repeat, the jurisdiction of the court is determined by the statute in force at the time of the commencement of the action.  Such jurisdiction of a court, whether in criminal or civil cases, once it attaches cannot be ousted by a subsequent happenings or events, although of a character which would have prevented jurisdiction from attaching in the first instance.

Therefore, an alien who filed a petition for adoption before the effectivity of the Family code, although denied the right to adopt under Art. 184 of said Code, may continue with his petition under the law prevailing before the Family Code.

Adoption statutes, being humane and salutary, hold the interests and welfare of the child to be of paramount consideration.  They are designed to provide homes, parental care and education for unfortunate, needy or orphaned children and give them the protection of society and family in the person of the adopter, as well as childless couples or persons to experience the joy of parenthood and give them legally a child in the person of the adopted for the manifestation of their natural parent instincts.  Every reasonable intendment should be sustained to promote and fulfill these noble and compassionate objectives of the law.

In Re Petition for Adoption of Michelle Lim and Michael Lim

In Re Petition for Adoption of Michelle Lim and Michael Lim

Facts: Spouses Monina P. Lim and Primo Lim were childless. Subsequently, two minor children, whose parents were unknown, were entrusted to them by a certain Lucia Ayuban. Being so eager to have children of their own, Monina and Primo registered the children to make it appear that they were the children’s parents. The children were named Michelle P. Lim and Michael Jude P. Lim. The spouses reared and cared for the children as if they were their own. Unfortunately, in 1998, Primo died. On 27 December 2000, Monina married Angel Olario, an American citizen. 

Monina decided to adopt the children by availing of the amnesty given under RA 8552 to individuals who simulated the birth of a child.  In 2002, she filed separate petitions for adoption of Michelle and Michael before the trial court. Michelle was then 25 years old and already married and Michael was 18 years and seven months old. Michelle and her husband, Michael and Olario gave their consent to the adoption as evidenced by their Affidavits of Consent.

On 15 September 2004, the trial court rendered judgment dismissing the petitions. The trial court ruled that since Monina had remarried, she should have filed the petition jointly with her new husband.

Monina appealed contending that the rule on joint adoption must be relaxed because it is the duty of the court and the State to protect the paramount interest and welfare of the child to be adopted. Petitioner argues that the legal maxim “dura lex sed lex” is not applicable to adoption cases. She argues that joint parental authority is not necessary in  this case since, at the time the petitions were filed, Michelle was 25 years old and already married, while Michael was already 18 years of age. Parental authority is not anymore necessary since they have been emancipated having attained the age of majority.

Issues: 

1. Whether or not petitioner, who has remarried, can singly adopt.

2. Whether or not joint parental authority is not anymore necessary since the children have been emancipated having reached the age of majority.

Held:

1. No. The law is explicit. Husband and wife shall jointly adopt except in the following cases: 

(i) if one spouse seeks to adopt the legitimate son/daughter of the other; or 

(ii) if one spouse seeks to adopt his/her own illegitimate son/daughter: Provided, however, That the other spouse has signified his/her consent thereto; or 

(iii) if the spouses are legally separated from each other, which was not present in the case at bar. 

The use of the word “shall” means that  joint adoption by the husband and the wife is mandatory. This is in consonance with the concept of joint parental authority over the child which is the ideal situation. As the child to be adopted is elevated to the level of a legitimate child, it is but natural to require the spouses to adopt jointly. The rule also insures harmony between the spouses. Since the petitions for adoption were filed only by petitioner herself, without joining her husband, Olario, the trial court was correct in denying the petitions for adoption on this ground.

Neither does petitioner fall under any of the three exceptions enumerated in Section 7. First, the children to be adopted are not the legitimate children of petitioner or of her husband Olario. Second, the children are not the illegitimate children of  petitioner. And third, petitioner and Olario are not legally separated from each other.

The fact that Olario gave his consent to the adoption as shown in his Affidavit of Consent does not suffice. There are certain requirements that Olario must comply being an American citizen. He must meet the qualifications set forth in Section 7 of RA 8552 such as: (1) he must prove that his country has diplomatic relations with the Republic of the Philippines; (2) he must have been living in the Philippines for at least three continuous years prior to the filing of the application for adoption; (3) he must maintain such residency until the adoption decree is entered; (4) he has legal capacity to adopt in his own country; and (5) the adoptee is allowed to enter the adopter’s country as the latter’s adopted child. None of these qualifications were shown and proved during the trial.

These requirements on residency and certification of the alien’s qualification to adopt cannot likewise be waived pursuant to Section 7. The children or adoptees are not relatives within the fourth degree of consanguinity or affinity of petitioner or of Olario. Neither are the adoptees the legitimate children of petitioner.

2. Petitioner's contention is untenable. Parental authority includes caring for and rearing the children for civic consciousness and efficiency and the development of their moral, mental and physical character and well-being. The father and the mother shall jointly exercise parental authority over the persons of their common children. Even the remarriage of the surviving parent shall not affect the parental authority over the children, unless the court appoints another person to be the guardian of the person or property of the children.

It is true that when the child reaches the age of emancipation — that is, when he attains the age of majority or 18 years of age —  emancipation terminates parental authority over the person and property of the child, who shall then be qualified and responsible for all acts of civil life.  However,   parental authority is merely just one of the effects of legal adoption. 

Even if emancipation terminates parental authority, the adoptee is still considered a legitimate child of the adopter with all the  rights of a legitimate child such as: (1) to bear the surname of the father and the mother; (2) to receive support from their parents; and (3) to be entitled to the legitime and other successional rights. Conversely, the adoptive parents shall, with respect to the adopted child, enjoy all the benefits to which biological parents are entitled such as support and successional rights.