Republic vs Miller Case Digest

Republic vs Claude A. Miller and Jumrus E. Miller
G.R. No. 125932.  April 21, 1999

Facts: On July 29, 1988, Spouses Miller, both American citizens, filed with the RTC, Angeles City a verified petition to adopt Michael Magno Madayag, a Filipino child, under the provision of the Child and Youth Welfare Code which allows aliens to adopt.  The natural parents executed affidavits giving their irrevocable consent to the adoption and the DSWD recommended approval of the petition on the basis of its evaluation. On May 12, 1989, the trial court rendered decision granting the petition for adoption.

On August 3, 1998, the Family Code became effective, prohibiting the adoption of a Filipino child by aliens.

The Solicitor General appealed to the granting of the petition for adoption by the RTC.

Issue: 

Whether or not aliens may be allowed to adopt a Filipino child when the petition for adoption was filed prior to the effectivity of the Family Code prohibiting the same.

Held:

Yes. An alien qualified to adopt under the Child and Youth Welfare Code, which was in force at the time of the filing of the petition, acquired a vested right which could not be affected by the subsequent enactment of a new law disqualifying him.

The enactment of the Family Code, effective August 3, 1988, will not impair the right of respondents who are aliens to adopt a Filipino child because the right has become vested at the time of filing of the petition for adoption and shall be governed by the law then in force. A vested right is one whose existence, effectivity and extent does not depend upon events foreign to the will of the holder.  Vested rights include not only legal or equitable title to the enforcement of a demand, but also an exemption from new obligations created after the right has vested.

As long as the petition for adoption was sufficient in form and substance in accordance with the law in governance at the time it was filed, the court acquires jurisdiction and retains it until it fully disposes of the case.  To repeat, the jurisdiction of the court is determined by the statute in force at the time of the commencement of the action.  Such jurisdiction of a court, whether in criminal or civil cases, once it attaches cannot be ousted by a subsequent happenings or events, although of a character which would have prevented jurisdiction from attaching in the first instance.

Therefore, an alien who filed a petition for adoption before the effectivity of the Family code, although denied the right to adopt under Art. 184 of said Code, may continue with his petition under the law prevailing before the Family Code.

Adoption statutes, being humane and salutary, hold the interests and welfare of the child to be of paramount consideration.  They are designed to provide homes, parental care and education for unfortunate, needy or orphaned children and give them the protection of society and family in the person of the adopter, as well as childless couples or persons to experience the joy of parenthood and give them legally a child in the person of the adopted for the manifestation of their natural parent instincts.  Every reasonable intendment should be sustained to promote and fulfill these noble and compassionate objectives of the law.

In Re Petition for Adoption of Michelle Lim and Michael Lim

In Re Petition for Adoption of Michelle Lim and Michael Lim

Facts: Spouses Monina P. Lim and Primo Lim were childless. Subsequently, two minor children, whose parents were unknown, were entrusted to them by a certain Lucia Ayuban. Being so eager to have children of their own, Monina and Primo registered the children to make it appear that they were the children’s parents. The children were named Michelle P. Lim and Michael Jude P. Lim. The spouses reared and cared for the children as if they were their own. Unfortunately, in 1998, Primo died. On 27 December 2000, Monina married Angel Olario, an American citizen. 

Monina decided to adopt the children by availing of the amnesty given under RA 8552 to individuals who simulated the birth of a child.  In 2002, she filed separate petitions for adoption of Michelle and Michael before the trial court. Michelle was then 25 years old and already married and Michael was 18 years and seven months old. Michelle and her husband, Michael and Olario gave their consent to the adoption as evidenced by their Affidavits of Consent.

On 15 September 2004, the trial court rendered judgment dismissing the petitions. The trial court ruled that since Monina had remarried, she should have filed the petition jointly with her new husband.

Monina appealed contending that the rule on joint adoption must be relaxed because it is the duty of the court and the State to protect the paramount interest and welfare of the child to be adopted. Petitioner argues that the legal maxim “dura lex sed lex” is not applicable to adoption cases. She argues that joint parental authority is not necessary in  this case since, at the time the petitions were filed, Michelle was 25 years old and already married, while Michael was already 18 years of age. Parental authority is not anymore necessary since they have been emancipated having attained the age of majority.

Issues: 

1. Whether or not petitioner, who has remarried, can singly adopt.

2. Whether or not joint parental authority is not anymore necessary since the children have been emancipated having reached the age of majority.

Held:

1. No. The law is explicit. Husband and wife shall jointly adopt except in the following cases: 

(i) if one spouse seeks to adopt the legitimate son/daughter of the other; or 

(ii) if one spouse seeks to adopt his/her own illegitimate son/daughter: Provided, however, That the other spouse has signified his/her consent thereto; or 

(iii) if the spouses are legally separated from each other, which was not present in the case at bar. 

The use of the word “shall” means that  joint adoption by the husband and the wife is mandatory. This is in consonance with the concept of joint parental authority over the child which is the ideal situation. As the child to be adopted is elevated to the level of a legitimate child, it is but natural to require the spouses to adopt jointly. The rule also insures harmony between the spouses. Since the petitions for adoption were filed only by petitioner herself, without joining her husband, Olario, the trial court was correct in denying the petitions for adoption on this ground.

Neither does petitioner fall under any of the three exceptions enumerated in Section 7. First, the children to be adopted are not the legitimate children of petitioner or of her husband Olario. Second, the children are not the illegitimate children of  petitioner. And third, petitioner and Olario are not legally separated from each other.

The fact that Olario gave his consent to the adoption as shown in his Affidavit of Consent does not suffice. There are certain requirements that Olario must comply being an American citizen. He must meet the qualifications set forth in Section 7 of RA 8552 such as: (1) he must prove that his country has diplomatic relations with the Republic of the Philippines; (2) he must have been living in the Philippines for at least three continuous years prior to the filing of the application for adoption; (3) he must maintain such residency until the adoption decree is entered; (4) he has legal capacity to adopt in his own country; and (5) the adoptee is allowed to enter the adopter’s country as the latter’s adopted child. None of these qualifications were shown and proved during the trial.

These requirements on residency and certification of the alien’s qualification to adopt cannot likewise be waived pursuant to Section 7. The children or adoptees are not relatives within the fourth degree of consanguinity or affinity of petitioner or of Olario. Neither are the adoptees the legitimate children of petitioner.

2. Petitioner's contention is untenable. Parental authority includes caring for and rearing the children for civic consciousness and efficiency and the development of their moral, mental and physical character and well-being. The father and the mother shall jointly exercise parental authority over the persons of their common children. Even the remarriage of the surviving parent shall not affect the parental authority over the children, unless the court appoints another person to be the guardian of the person or property of the children.

It is true that when the child reaches the age of emancipation — that is, when he attains the age of majority or 18 years of age —  emancipation terminates parental authority over the person and property of the child, who shall then be qualified and responsible for all acts of civil life.  However,   parental authority is merely just one of the effects of legal adoption. 

Even if emancipation terminates parental authority, the adoptee is still considered a legitimate child of the adopter with all the  rights of a legitimate child such as: (1) to bear the surname of the father and the mother; (2) to receive support from their parents; and (3) to be entitled to the legitime and other successional rights. Conversely, the adoptive parents shall, with respect to the adopted child, enjoy all the benefits to which biological parents are entitled such as support and successional rights. 

Alcantara vs. Alcantara Case Digest

Alcantara vs. Alcantara 

G.R. No. 167746, August 28, 2007

Facts: Restituto M. Alcantara filed a petition for annulment of marriage against respondent Rosita A. Alcantara alleging that on 8 December 1982 he and respondent, without securing the required marriage license, went to the Manila City Hall for the purpose of looking for a person who could arrange a marriage for them. They met a person who, for a fee, arranged their wedding before a certain priest. They got married on the same day. They went through another marriage ceremony in a church in Tondo, Manila, on 26 March 1983. The marriage was likewise celebrated without the parties securing a marriage license. The alleged marriage license, procured in Carmona, Cavite, appearing on the marriage contract, is a sham, as neither party was a resident of Carmona, and they never went to Carmona to apply for a license. In 1988, they parted ways and lived separate lives. Petitioner prayed that after due hearing, judgment be issued declaring their marriage void and ordering the Civil Registrar to cancel the corresponding marriage contract and its entry on file.  

Rosita asserted the validity of their marriage and maintained that there was a marriage license issued as evidenced by a certification from the Office of the Civil Registry of Carmona, Cavite. Petitioner has a mistress with whom he has three children. Petitioner only filed the annulment of their marriage to evade prosecution for concubinage. 

After hearing, the trial court dismissed the petition for lack of merit. The CA affirmed the decision.

Issue:  Was there an absence of marriage license that would render the marriage between petitioner and respondent void ab initio?

Held: No. A valid marriage license is a requisite of marriage, the absence of which renders the marriage void ab initio. The requirement and issuance of a marriage license is the State’s demonstration of its involvement and participation in every marriage, in the maintenance of which the general public is interested.

To be considered void on the ground of absence of a marriage license, the law requires that the absence of such marriage license must be apparent on the marriage contract, or at the very least, supported by a certification from the local civil registrar that no such marriage license was issued to the parties.  In this case, the marriage contract between the petitioner and respondent reflects a marriage license number. A certification to this effect was also issued by the local civil registrar of Carmona, Cavite. The certification moreover is precise in that it specifically identified the parties to whom the marriage license was issued, namely Restituto Alcantara and Rosita Almario, further validating the fact that a license was in fact issued to the parties herein. This certification enjoys the presumption that official duty has been regularly performed and the issuance of the marriage license was done in the regular conduct of official business. Hence, petitioner cannot insist on the absence of a marriage license to impugn the validity of his marriage. 

Petitioner, in a faint attempt to demolish the probative value of the marriage license, claims that neither he nor respondent is a resident of Carmona, Cavite.  Even then, we still hold that there is no sufficient basis to annul petitioner and respondent’s marriage. Issuance of a marriage license in a city or municipality, not the residence of either of the contracting parties, and issuance of a marriage license despite the absence of publication or prior to the completion of the 10-day period for publication are considered mere irregularities that do not affect the validity of the marriage.  An irregularity in any of the formal requisites of marriage does not affect its validity but the party or parties responsible for the irregularity are civilly, criminally and administratively liable.

Likewise, the issue raised by petitioner -- that they appeared before a “fixer” who arranged everything for them and who facilitated the ceremony before a certain priest -- will not strengthen his posture.  The authority of the officer or clergyman shown to have performed a marriage ceremony will be presumed in the absence of any showing to the contrary. Moreover, the solemnizing officer is not duty-bound to investigate whether or not a marriage license has been duly and regularly issued by the local civil registrar. All the solemnizing officer needs to know is that the license has been issued by the competent official, and it may be presumed from the issuance of the license that said official has fulfilled the duty to ascertain whether the contracting parties had fulfilled the requirements of law.

Anaya vs. Palaroan Case Digest

Anaya vs. Palaroan

G.R. No. L-27930, November 26, 1970

Facts: On 7 January 1954, after one month of marriage to Aurora Anaya, Fernando Palaroan filed a complaint to annul it on the ground that his consent was obtained through force and intimidation. The court dismissed the complaint and granted Aurora's counterclaim. While the amount of the counterclaim was being negotiated, Fernando allegedly divulged that several months prior to the marriage, he had pre-marital relationships with a close relative of his. Anaya filed suit to annul the marriage and to recover moral damages. 

Fernando denied having had pre-marital relationship with a close relative and having committed any fraud against Aurora. He did not pray for the dismissal of the complaint but for its dismissal "with respect to the alleged moral damages." Aurora replied stating that Fernando had no intention of performing his marital duties and obligations since the marriage was contracted as a means for him to escape marrying the close relative that was intimated above. The trial court dismissed the complaint, holding that Aurora's allegation of the fraud was legally insufficient to invalidate her marriage. Aurora appealed. 

Issue:  Is non-disclosure to a wife by her husband of his pre-marital relationship with another woman a ground for annulment of marriage?

Held: No. Non-disclosure of a husband's pre-marital relationship with another woman is not one of the enumerated circumstances that would constitute a ground for annulment; and it is further excluded by the last paragraph of the article, providing that "no other misrepresentation or deceit as to ... chastity" shall give ground for an action to annul a marriage. While a woman may detest such non-disclosure of premarital lewdness or feel having been thereby cheated into giving her consent to the marriage, nevertheless the law does not assuage her grief after her consent was solemnly given, for upon marriage she entered into an institution in which society, and not herself alone, is interested. The lawmaker's intent being plain, the Court's duty is to give effect to the same, whether it agrees with the rule or not. 

Wassmer vs. Velez Case Digest

Wassmer vs. Velez
G.R. No. L-20089, December 26, 1964
12 SCRA 648

Facts: Francisco Velez and Beatriz Wassmer applied for a Marriage License on August 23, 1954. The wedding was to take place on September 4, 1954. All the necessary preparations were undertaken for the said event. However, two days before the wedding, Francisco left a note for Beatriz informing her that the wedding will not push through because his mother opposed the union. The following day, he sent her a telegram stating that he will be returning very soon. Francisco never showed up and has not been heard since then. Beatriz subsequently sued Francisco for damages. The trial court ordered Francisco to pay Beatriz actual, moral and exemplary damages. 

Francisco filed a petition for relief from orders, judgment and proceedings and motion for new trial and reconsideration which was denied by the trial court. Francisco appealed to the Supreme Court, asserting that the judgment is contrary to law as there is no provision in the Civil Code authorizing an action for breach of promise to marry.  

Issue: May Francisco be held liable to pay Beatriz damages for breach of promise to marry?

Held: Yes. Francisco may be held liable under Article 21 of the Civil Code, which provides: "Any person who wilfully causes loss or injury to another in a manner that is contrary to morals, good customs or public policy shall compensate the latter for the damage."

Mere breach of promise to marry is not an actionable wrong. But to formally set a wedding and go through all the preparation and publicity, only to walk out of it when the matrimony is about to be solemnized, is quite different. Surely this is not a case of mere breach of promise to marry. This is palpably and unjustifiably contrary to good customs for which defendant must be held answerable in damages in accordance with Article 21.

Vda. De Chua vs. CA Case Digest

Vda. De Chua vs. CA

G.R. No. 116835 March 5, 1998

Facts: From 1970 up to 1981, Roberto Chua lived out of wedlock with private respondent Florita A. Vallejo and they begot two sons. On 28 May 1992, Roberto Chua died intestate in Davao City. 

On 2 July 1992, Vallejo filed with the Regional Trial Court of Cotabato City a petition for the guardianship and administration over the persons and properties of the two minors. 

Petitioner Antonietta Garcia Vda. de Chua, representing to be the surviving spouse of Roberto Chua, filed a Motion to Dismiss on the ground of improper venue. Petitioner alleged that at the time of the decedent’s death, Davao City was his residence, hence, the Regional Trial Court of Davao City is the proper forum. In support of her allegation, petitioner presented the following documents: (1) photocopy of the marriage contract; (2) Transfer Certificate of Title issued in the name of Roberto L. Chua married to Antonietta Garcia, and a resident of Davao City; (3) Residence Certificates from 1988 and 1989 issued at Davao City indicating that he was married and was born in Cotabato City; (4) Income Tax Returns for 1990 and 1991 filed in Davao City where the status of the decedent was stated as married; and, (5) Passport of the decedent specifying that he was married and his residence was Davao City.

Vallejo contends that movant/oppositor Antonietta Chua is not the surviving spouse of the late Roberto L. Chua but a pretender to the estate of the latter since the deceased never contracted marriage with any woman until he died.

The trial court ruled that petitioner has no personality to file the motion not having proven his status as a wife of the decedent. The Order was appealed to the CA, but it decided in favor of herein respondents.

Issue: Was petitioner able to prove her marriage to Roberto L. Chua?

Held: No. The best proof of marriage between a man and wife is a marriage contract which petitioner failed to produce. The lower court correctly disregarded the Photostat copy of the marriage certificate which she presented, this being a violation of the best evidence rule, together with other worthless pieces of evidence. Transfer Certificates of Title, Residence Certificates, passports and other similar documents cannot prove marriage especially so when the private respondent has submitted a certification from the Local Civil Registrar concerned that the alleged marriage was not registered and a letter from the judge alleged to have solemnized the marriage that he has not solemnized said alleged marriage. 

Who shall fix the family domicile? In case of disagreement, who shall decide?

The husband and wife shall fix the family domicile. In case of disagreement, the court shall decide. (Art. 69, FC)

In what cases shall the system of complete separation of property govern the property relations between the spouses?

The system of complete separation of property shall govern the property relations between the spouses only in the following cases:

1. When it is expressly provided for in the marriage settlements (Arts 134 and 74, FC);

2. When it is so declared by a competent court (Art. 134, FC); and,

3. When the surviving spouse failed to liquidate the absolute community or conjugal partnership of gains of a previous marriage which has been terminated by death within the one-year period required by law prior to contracting another marriage. The subsequent marriage is mandatorily governed by a regime of complete separation. (Arts. 103 and 130, FC) 

When does Article 148 of the Family Code applies?

Article 148 of the Family Code applies in cases where the parties in union are incapacitated to marry each other. It refers to the property regime of bigamous marriages, adulterous relationships, relationships in a state of concubine, relationships where both man and woman are married to other persons, multiple alliances of the same married man. (Cariño vs. Cariño, G.R. No. 132529.  February 2, 2001)

What rule governs the property relations where one of the parties has legal impediment to marry the other?

When the parties spouses suffer from a legal impediment to marry or when they do not live exclusively with each other as husband and wife, the provisions of Article 148 of the Family Code apply, where only the properties acquired by both of the parties through their actual joint contribution of money, property, or industry shall be owned by them in common in proportion to their respective contributions. Proof of actual contribution is required, unlike in situations covered by Article 147. In the absence of proof of extent of the parties’ respective contribution, their share are presumed to be equal. The same rule and presumption shall apply to joint deposits of money and evidences of credit.

If one of the parties is validly married to another, his or her share in the co-ownership shall accrue to the absolute community or conjugal partnership existing in such valid marriage. If the party who acted in bad faith is not validly married to another, his or her shall be forfeited in the manner provided in the last paragraph of the preceding Article.

The foregoing rules on forfeiture shall likewise apply even if both parties are in bad faith. (Agapay vs. Palang, G.R. No. 116668 July 28 1997; Article 148, FC)

Discuss the requirement of proof of "actual joint contribution" and the presumption of "equality of contribution" under Art. 148 of the Family Code

A reading of Article 148 readily shows that there must be proof of “actual joint contribution” by both the live-in partners before the property becomes co-owned by them in proportion to their contribution.  The presumption of equality of contribution arises only in the absence of proof of their proportionate contributions, subject to the condition that actual joint contribution is proven first.  Simply put, proof of actual contribution by both parties is required, otherwise there is no co-ownership and no presumption of equal sharing. (Villanueva vs. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 143286.  April 14, 2004)

Does Article 148, FC apply retroactively?

Although the adulterous cohabitation of the parties or the acquisition of the property occurred before the effectivity of the Family Code on August 3, 1998, Article 148 applies because this provision was intended precisely to fill up the hiatus in Article 144 of the Civil Code.  Before Article 148 of the Family Code was enacted, there was no provision governing property relations of couples living in a state of adultery or concubinage.  (Atienza vs. De Castro, G.R. No. 169698, November 29, 2006)

What are donations by reason of marriage?

Donations by reason of marriage or donation propter nuptias, as stated in Article 82 of the Family code, are those which are made before its celebration, in consideration of the same, and in favor of one or both of the future spouses. 

What are the requisites for a valid donation propter nuptias?

For a donation propter nuptias to be valid, the donation must be made: (BOC)

1. Before the celebration of the marriage;

2. In consideration of the marriage; and

3. In favor of one or both of the future spouses. 

What are the distinctions between donations by reason of marriage and ordinary donations?

Donation Propter Nuptias	Ordinary Donations
As to formalities, it is governed by the rules on ordinary donations except that if future property is donated, it must conform with the formalities of wills.	It is governed by the rules on donations (Articles 725- 773, NCC)
As to extent, both present and future properties may be donated	Only present properties may be donated
As to acceptance, donation propter nuptias does not require express acceptance.	As a general rule, express acceptance is necessary.
As to revocation,  the grounds are found in Article 86 of the Family Code	Grounds are found in the law on donations.

What are the formalities required in donations propter nuptias?

1. PRESENT PROPERTY - 

A. PERSONAL PROPERTY - If what is donated is a personal property the value of which exceeds P5,000.00, the donation and acceptance must both be in writing; otherwise, the donation is void.

B. REAL PROPERTY - If what is donated is a real property, the donation and acceptance must both be in public instrument; otherwise, the donation is void.

2. FUTURE PROPERTY - If what is donated is a future property, the donation must be in the form of wills. 

Can property subject to encumbrances be donated?

Donations by reason of marriage of property subject to encumbrances shall be valid. In case of foreclosure of the encumbrance and the property is sold for less than the total amount of the obligation secured, the donee shall not be liable for the deficiency. If the property is sold for more than the total amount of said obligation, the donee shall be entitled to the excess. (Art. 85, FC)

What are the grounds for revoking a donation by reason of marriage?

A donation by reason of marriage may be revoked by the donor on the following grounds:

(1) If the marriage is not celebrated or judicially declared void ab initio except donations made in the marriage settlements, which shall be governed by Article 81;

(2) When the marriage takes place without the consent of the parents or guardian, as required by law;

(3) When the marriage is annulled, and the donee acted in bad faith;

(4) Upon legal separation, the donee being the guilty spouse;

(5) If it is with a resolutory condition and the condition is complied with;

(6) When the donee has committed an act of ingratitude as specified by the provisions of the Civil Code on donations in general.  (Art. 86, FC)

Are donations made by either spouse in favor of the other during the marriage valid?

Every donation or grant of gratuitous advantage, direct or indirect, between the spouses during the marriage shall be void. (Art. 87, FC) 

Why are donations between the spouses during the marriage prohibited?

Donations between spouses during marriage are prohibited. And this is so because if transfers or conveyances between spouses were allowed during marriage, that would destroy the system of conjugal partnership, a basic policy in civil law. It was also designed to prevent the exercise of undue influence by one spouse over the other, as well as to protect the institution of marriage, which is the cornerstone of family law. (Ching vs. Goyanko, Jr., G.R. No. 165879, November 10, 2006)